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Conceptions of Analysis in Early Analytic Philosophy
 
Over the last few years, within analytic philosophy as a whole, there has developed a wider
concern with methodological questions, partly as a result of the increasing interest in the
foundations — both historical and philosophical — of analytic philosophy, and partly due to
the resurgence of metaphysics in reaction to the positivism that dominated major strands
in the early analytic movement. In this paper I elucidate the key conceptions of analysis
that arose during the formative years of analytic philosophy, focusing, in particular, on the
debate over the nature of analysis in the early 1930s, within what was called at the time
the ÔCambridge School of AnalysisÕ, and the development of CarnapÕs conception(s) of
logical analysis during his critical phase when he was a central figure in the Vienna Circle.
In the final section, with this in mind, I revisit the origins of analytic philosophy in the work
of Frege, and show how the distinctions I draw can be used in diagnosing some of the
tensions that are present in FregeÕs thought and which have given rise to controversy in
the interpretation of Frege.
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⁄1 Modes of Analysis
 
In its basic sense, ÔanalysisÕ means a 
 
working back to what is more fundamental
 
,
but there are clearly many different kinds of things that can be analysed, and even
where the same thing is being analysed, many different kinds of things that can
be regarded as more fundamental, and many different forms that such a process
of Ôworking backÕ can take. For the purposes of the present paper, we may distin-
guish three core 
 
modes
 
 of analysis, which may be realized and combined in a
variety of ways in constituting specific conceptions or projects of analysis.
 
1
 
 I call
 
1 
 
For fuller discussion of the various forms of analysis in the history of philosophy, see M.
Beaney, 
 
Analysis
 
 (forthcoming).
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these the 
 
regressive
 
 mode, concerned to identify the Ôstarting-pointsÕ (principles,
premisses, causes, etc.) by means of which something can be ÔexplainedÕ or
ÔgeneratedÕ, the 
 
decompositional
 
 mode, concerned to identify the components Ñ
as well as structure Ñ of something, and the 
 
interpretive
 
 mode, concerned to
ÔtranslateÕ something into a particular framework. The first mode has its roots in
ancient Greek geometry and has had a significant influence throughout the history
of philosophy. The key idea here is that of Ôworking backÕ to first principles, by
means of which to solve a given problem (e.g. construct a particular geometrical
figure, derive a particular conclusion or explain a particular fact). The second
mode forms the core of what is undoubtedly the conception of analysis that
prevails today. Analysis is seen here as involving the 
 
decomposition
 
 of something
(e.g. a concept or proposition) into its constituents.
 
2
 
 The distinction between these
first two modes has been widely (though by no means sufficiently) recognized by
philosophers. But it is also important to recognize a third main mode, which
emerges explicitly in the twentieth century, but which has always been around
implicitly in conceptions and projects of analysis. 
 
Any analysis presupposes a
particular framework of interpretation
 
, and preliminary work is done in 
 
interpret-
ing
 
 what it is we are seeking to analyse Ñ the 
 
analysandum
 
 Ñ before we engage
in other processes of Ôworking back to what is more fundamentalÕ. As we will see,
it was this idea that came of age in early analytic philosophy.
 
⁄2 Paraphrastic and Reductive Analysis: The Cambridge School
 
What became known at the time as the Cambridge School of Analysis was pri-
marily active in the 1930s. Based in Cambridge, it drew its inspiration from the
logical atomism of Wittgenstein and Russell and the earlier work of Moore. As
well as Moore himself, its central figures included John Wisdom, Susan Stebbing,
Max Black and Austin Duncan-Jones. Together with C.A. Mace and Gilbert Ryle,
Stebbing and Duncan-Jones (who was its first editor) founded the journal 
 
Analysis
 
,
which first appeared in November 1933 and which remains the flagship of analytic
philosophy today.
The paradigm of analysis at this time was undoubtedly RussellÕs theory of
descriptions, first expounded in 1905. On RussellÕs account, ÔThe present King
 
2 
 
To take just one example, here is BlackburnÕs definition of ÔanalysisÕ in his recent 
 
Oxford
Dictionary of Philosophy
 
: Òthe process of breaking a concept down into more simple parts, so that
its logical structure is displayedÓ.
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of France is baldÕ was to be ÔanalysedÕ as ÔThere is one and only one King of
France, and whatever is King of France is baldÕ, which could then be readily
formalized into the new predicate calculus. Wittgenstein commended Russell for
having shown the need to distinguish between the grammatical form and the
logical form of a proposition (cf. 
 
Tractatus
 
, 4.0031), and the theory of descriptions
clearly opened up the whole project of rephrasing propositions into their ÔcorrectÕ
logical form, not only to avoid the problems generated by misleading surface
grammatical form (exemplified in such propositions as ÔGod existsÕ or ÔUnicorns
do not existÕ),
 
3
 
 but also to reveal their Ôdeep structureÕ. Embedded in the meta-
physics of logical atomism, this gave rise to the idea of ÔanalysisÕ as the process
of uncovering the Ôultimate constituentsÕ of our propositions (or the primitive
elements of the ÔfactsÕ that our propositions represent).
This characterization already suggests a distinction that needs to be drawn here
Ñ between analysis as mere 
 
rephrasal
 
 (with no metaphysical commitments) and
analysis as 
 
reduction
 
. Let us call the conceptions reflected here 
 
paraphrastic
 
 and
 
reductive
 
 analysis, respectively. The use of the first term alludes to BenthamÕs
conception of paraphrasis, which John Wisdom, in his first book, published in
1931, saw as anticipating RussellÕs method of analysis.
 
4
 
 The use of the second
term indicates that the aim is to uncover the logically or metaphysically more
primitive elements of a given complex (e.g. proposition or fact). Paraphrastic
analysis involves ÔinterpretationÕ, whilst reductive analysis involves Ôdecomposi-
tionÕ.
This distinction reflects the distinction that did indeed come to be drawn in the
1930s by Susan Stebbing and John Wisdom, in particular, between what was
called ÔlogicalÕ or Ôsame-levelÕ analysis and ÔphilosophicalÕ or ÔmetaphysicalÕ or
ÔreductiveÕ or ÔdirectionalÕ or Ônew-levelÕ analysis.
 
5
 
 The first translates the prop-
osition to be analysed into better logical form, whilst the second exhibits its
underlying metaphysical commitments. In RussellÕs example, having Ôanalysed
 
3 
 
I return to this in ⁄4 below.
 
4 
 
In his 
 
Essay on Logic
 
 (published posthumously, in 1843), Bentham writes: ÒBy the word
paraphrasis may be designated that sort of exposition which may be afforded by transmuting into a
proposition, having for its subject some real entity, a proposition which has not for its subject any
other than a fictitious entityÓ (1843: p. 246). Bentham applies the method in Ôanalysing awayÕ talk
of ÔobligationsÕ (cf. 1843: p. 247). Wisdom discusses the relationships between BenthamÕs Ôfictitious
entitiesÕ and the Ôlogical constructionsÕ of the Cambridge School in the second half of his 
 
Interpre-
tation and Analysis
 
.
 
5 
 
See esp. Stebbing, 1932, 1933, 1934, and Wisdom, 1934. Cf. Urmson, 1956: pp. 39ff.
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awayÕ the definite description, what is then shown is just what commitments
remain Ñ to logical constants and concepts (such as ÔKing of FranceÕ), which
may in turn require further ÔanalysisÕ to ÔreduceÕ them to things of our supposed
immediate acquaintance.
The conception of analysis as involving both ÔparaphrasisÕ and ÔreductionÕ was
characteristic of the Cambridge School in the early 1930s. In a paper entitled ÔThe
Method of Analysis in MetaphysicsÕ, published in 1932, Susan Stebbing set out
to elucidate this conception, and to articulate, and consider the justification of, its
presuppositions. She first distinguishes her own conception of metaphysics from
that of McTaggart, whom she understands as offering us a conception of Ôultimate
realityÕ on the basis of which everything else is to be either explained or explained
away. The method involved here, she says, is thus 
 
deductive
 
, the aim being to
construct a system in which our ordinary beliefs, to the extent that they can be
justified at all, are derived from the ultimate principles. (1932: pp. 66-8.) On
StebbingÕs conception, however, the task is not to find 
 
reasons
 
 for our beliefs, but
to make clear just what those beliefs involve. We do not start from some concep-
tion of Ôultimate realityÕ and then attempt to 
 
deduce
 
 our ordinary beliefs, but start
from our ordinary beliefs and simply proceed to 
 
analyse
 
 them. (1932: pp. 68-70.)
The aim, in other words, is to pursue analysis not in the ÔregressiveÕ sense, moving
back to Ôfirst principlesÕ, but in the ÔdecompositionalÕ sense, taking something as
ÔgivenÕ and seeking to uncover its primitive components.
This method of analysis Stebbing finds exemplified in the work of Moore,
Russell, Broad and Wittgenstein (1932: p. 74); but she regards their own appre-
ciation of this method as deficient. She writes:
 
Just as every conception of the nature of metaphysical problems rests upon certain dogmatic
assumptions, so the use of a given metaphysical method rests upon certain presuppositions.
It does not, however, follow that those who use a certain method have paused to ask what
are the presuppositions upon which its successful employment rests; still less whether these
presuppositions could be justified. The philosophers who have used this method of analysis
have not, I think, seen fit to raise these questions, which seem to me important to ask and
difficult to answer. (1932: pp. 74-5.)
 
Stebbing goes on to distinguish what she calls Ôthe method of metaphysical anal-
ysisÕ, exemplified by the Cambridge School, from Ôthe method of symbolic anal-
ysisÕ, understood as abbreviating Ôthe method of analysis used in the construction
of postulational systemsÕ, utilized by the logical positivists of the Vienna and
Berlin Schools (1932: p. 76), and confines herself to the elucidation of the former.
 M
 
ICHAEL
 
 B
 
EANEY
 
101
 
As she sees it, there are three main assumptions that underlie the method of
metaphysical analysis, one logical and two metaphysical (1932: p. 85):
(1) If 
 
p
 
 is to be analysed, then 
 
p
 
 must be understood. It follows that there is at
least one expression which unambiguously expresses 
 
p
 
.
(2) If 
 
p
 
 is to be analysed, then it is not always the case that 
 
p
 
 is known to be
false, and it is sometimes the case that 
 
p
 
 is known to be true.
(3) Directional analysis is possible.
What is involved in the first, logical assumption? On StebbingÕs account, ÒTo
understand 
 
p
 
 is to know its immediate referenceÓ, and ÒThe immediate reference
of the proposition 
 
p
 
 is what would ordinarily be understood to be what the prop-
osition asserts. . . Thus the immediate reference of 
 
There is a table in this room
 
is what you have all understood, namely, that there is a table in this room.Ó (1932:
p. 78.) There is a strong suspicion of circularity here, and it is not clear how to
rectify it. Appealing to MooreÕs distinction between Ôunderstanding 
 
p
 
Õ and Ôknow-
ing the analysis of 
 
p
 
Õ, as she formulates it,
 
6
 
 Stebbing suggests that I understand 
 
p
 
when I Òknow how the expression expressing the proposition is being usedÓ (1932:
p. 86). But what are the criteria for knowing how an expression is used? Stebbing
writes that ÒI think it must be granted that we cannot understand 
 
p
 
 unless there is
some expression ÒSÓ which unambiguously expresses 
 
p
 
. Nor do I see how we can
analyse what we do not understand.Ó She states that there is Ôlittle difficultyÕ in
granting the first assumption, and that it is an assumption that is shared by the
method of symbolic analysis. (Ibid.) But the case of symbolic analysis seems
precisely to demonstrate its problematic status. For the main aim of Ôsymbolic
analysisÕ is to 
 
replace
 
 ordinary expressions, which may 
 
not
 
 be clearly understood,
by more precise, logically well-defined sentences. (I return to this in the next
section.) Of course, this means that there is indeed Ôat least one expression which
unambiguously expresses 
 
p
 
Õ, but in symbolic analysis, this is arrived at 
 
through
 
analysis, and it would be wrong to say that the proposition is clearly understood
 
prior
 
 to the analysis. Yet this does seem to be what Stebbing wants to say. At any
rate, StebbingÕs first assumption is by no means as unproblematic as she thinks.
 
7
 
With regard to the second and third assumptions, however, Stebbing admits
that they stand Òin serious need of justificationÓ (1932: p. 86). She writes:
 
6 
 
Moore himself formulates it as the distinction between understanding the meaning of an
expression and giving a correct analysis of its meaning. See ÔA Defence of Common SenseÕ (1925),
p. 111; referred to by Stebbing, 1932: p. 86.
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Once these presuppositions are explicitly stated in the form of assumptions, it becomes clear
that they are not logically necessary. These assumptions entail certain consequences with
regard to the constitution of the world. It cannot be maintained that the world is certainly
so constituted. If it could, then the method of metaphysics might be deductive. But unless
the world 
 
is
 
 so constituted metaphysical analysis is not possible. (1932: p. 87.)
 
This is an extraordinary confession, for it would appear to constitute a 
 
reductio
ad absurdum of metaphysical analysis. Clearly, the key assumption here, as Steb-
bing herself notes, is the assumption that what she calls Ôdirectional analysisÕ is
possible. She offers a number of semi-technical definitions in order to fill out what
is involved here (1932: pp. 83-5); but what is crucially assumed is that there are
basic facts (ultimately simple or atomic facts) upon which all the facts that are the
Ôimmediate referencesÕ of true propositions are based, and that it is the aim of
analysis to reveal these facts. Underlying this is the assumption we have already
questioned Ñ the assumption that what we are seeking to analyse already has a
determinate sense; but in any case, that there are absolute simples or basic facts
is even more problematic. These assumptions were amongst the main targets of
WittgensteinÕs Philosophical Investigations (see especially ⁄⁄ 27-78), which was
concerned to repudiate precisely that logical atomism of his earlier Tractatus
which had been taken up by the Cambridge School.
On StebbingÕs account, it is the idea that analysis has a ÔdirectionÕ that distin-
guishes ÔmetaphysicalÕ analysis from ÔsymbolicÕ analysis, which Stebbing sug-
gests Òmay very well be circularÓ (1932: p. 87). The aim is to get down to the
Ôultimate constituentsÕ of the world, and not merely to offer ÔtranslationsÕ of the
expressions to be analysed. ÔReductiveÕ and not just ÔparaphrasticÕ analysis, in
other words, is the goal. But if ÔreductiveÕ or ÔdirectionalÕ analysis turns out to be
confused, we are still left with ÔparaphrasticÕ analysis; and this equally leaves us
with the ÔsymbolicÕ analysis of the logical positivists. In drawing her paper to a
close, Stebbing reluctantly admits that once the key assumptions of metaphysical
analysis have been made explicit, Òso far from being certainly justified, [they] are
not even very plausibleÓ (1932: p. 92). But she fails to draw the obvious conclusion
Ñ that we should look elsewhere for more satisfying conceptions of analysis.
7 Of course, some distinction between what we know prior to the analysis and what we know
after the analysis must be made (unless we are to fall victim to the paradox of analysis), and we can
agree with Stebbing that such a distinction is Ôof great importanceÕ (1932: p. 86), but it is not clear
that Stebbing has articulated this distinction properly, and mere recognition of such a distinction
does nothing to justify the assumption that I do clearly ÔunderstandÕ p prior to the analysis of p. I
return to this in the next section.
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⁄3 Postulational Analysis: The Vienna Circle
In response to Stebbing, in a paper published in 1933, entitled ÔPhilosophical
AnalysisÕ, Max Black argued that Ôlogical analysisÕ, properly conceived, did not
have any metaphysical presuppositions at all, but was simply concerned to reveal
the structure of our propositions. According to Black, logical analysis is a branch
of applied mathematics, elucidating the logical form of expressions (their type,
level or multiplicity) by a testing process of substitution and translation, RussellÕs
theory of descriptions once again being seen as a paradigm here (1933: pp. 238-
50). In critique of Stebbing, Black repudiates the conception of Ôabsolutely spe-
cificÕ or Ôabsolutely simpleÕ elements, presupposed by Stebbing as the ultimate
products of metaphysical analysis (1933: pp. 255-6); but more fundamentally,
rejects the idea of metaphysical analysis as uncovering facts. The example Black
considers is the following:
(E) Every economist is fallible.
Black suggests that a metaphysical analysis, on StebbingÕs conception, at least at
an intermediate level, would yield the following set of facts:
(E#) Maynard Keynes is fallible, Josiah Stamp is fallible, etc.
Yet (E) does not mean the same as (E#), Black objects, unless ÔmeansÕ is being
used loosely in the sense of ÔentailsÕ. But analysis cannot exhibit the propositions
entailed, since this would require knowing, in this example, the name of every
economist. The correct analysis, Black suggests, is simply:
(E*) (x) (x is an economist) entails (x is fallible).
This is a Ôlogical analysis of structureÕ rather than a metaphysical uncovering of
facts. (1933: p. 257.)
It is clear that, for Black, analysis is paraphrastic rather than reductive, con-
cerned not with metaphysical constitution but only with logical structure; and it
is for this reason that he argues that logical analysis needs no metaphysical pre-
suppositions and hence is not open to the objections that Stebbing faces (1933:
pp. 254-8). He recognizes, however, that in some cases of analysis, such as the
analysis of mathematical concepts, more is involved than simply paraphrasis. In
these cases, where our ordinary or old concepts have led to contradictions, these
concepts must be replaced by new concepts to avoid the contradictions. But Black
is ambivalent as to whether this should really be called ÔanalysisÕ. He writes:
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This is a process of analysis supplemented by synthesis. Such a procedure diverts emphasis
from the original notions to be analyzed, which, in so far as they are confused and incon-
sistent, permit of no exact analysis. É
Philosophic analysis of mathematical concepts therefore tends to become a synthetic,
constructive process, providing new notions which are more precise and clearer than the
old notions they replace, and so chosen that all true statements involving the concepts inside
the mathematical system considered shall, as far as possible, remain true when the new are
substituted. (1933: p. 253.)
Talk here of analysis being Ôsupplemented by synthesisÕ, of there being Ôno exact
analysisÕ of confused concepts, and of analysis becoming a Ôsynthetic, construc-
tive processÕ suggests that Black is still under the grip of the decompositional
conception of analysis, even in the context in which paraphrastic rather than
reductive analysis is being advocated. But the fact that he still wants to talk of
ÔanalysisÕ shows that he recognizes that more is involved here than Ôdecomposi-
tionÕ. Using the term Ôconstructive analysisÕ, he goes on:
Such constructive analysis may, however, acquire a purely formal character when, instead
of analyzing, it replaces the concepts by a completely new set having the same formal
interconnections. A process of this kind is appropriate in the analysis of mathematics, but
should be called postulational analysis and carefully distinguished from logical analysis.
(1933: pp. 253-4.)
Here again talk of Ôconstructive analysisÕ involving something other than Ôana-
lyzingÕ suggests ambivalence; but we also have here a clue as to the resolution of
the tension. In so far as the construction of a new set of concepts remains answer-
able to certain features of the old set (e.g. to the assignment of truth-values to the
statements that involve them), we can agree that the process still counts as Ôanal-
ysisÕ Ñ revealing Ôformal interconnectionsÕ. What we have is a ÔparaphrasisÕ that
does indeed attempt to capture something of what it is analysing, and which is not
just replacing it. But if this is right, then the distinction that Black draws between
Ôlogical analysisÕ proper and Ôpostulational analysisÕ is not as clear-cut as he makes
out.8 Both involve paraphrasis, with merely varying degrees of answerability to
the features of what is being analysed. Paraphrasis, in other words, occurs along
a scale of forms Ñ from completely conservative to radically revisionist; and
postulational analysis is simply a species of logical analysis at the revisionist end
of the spectrum.
8 Black suggests that whilst logical analysis requires identity of meaning, postulational analysis
only requires logical equivalence (1933: p. 254). But this begs questions as to what these equivalence
relations are.
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It was the radical form of logical analysis Ñ postulational analysis Ñ that
Carnap, in particular, developed during the course of his work in the 1920s and
1930s; and what characterizes his development here is precisely the transition
from an early conception of method in which there is some ambivalence as to
whether ÔanalysisÕ is really involved to a later conception in which this ambiva-
lence is largely removed in favour of an explicitly articulated conception of Ôlog-
ical analysisÕ. The ambivalence is revealed most strikingly in what was the central
conception in his Aufbau of 1928 Ñ the conception of Ôquasi-analysisÕ.9 Influ-
enced by both Russell on the one hand and the neo-Kantians on the other hand,
the ambivalence revealed itself as the tension between an empiricist reductive and
a neo-Kantian structural conception of analysis.
Influenced too by Gestalt psychology (and perhaps FregeÕs context principle),
Carnap held that the fundamental ÔunitsÕ of experience were not the qualities (the
colours, shapes, etc.) involved in individual experiences (such as seeing a physical
object), but those experiences themselves, taken as indivisible wholes. These were
his ÔElementarerlebnisseÕ, which formed the basis of the phenomenalistic version
of his ÔKonstitutionssystemÕ (⁄67).10 But if these were indeed ÔindivisibleÕ, then
how was it possible to determine the qualities involved in the elementary experi-
ences? ÔAnalysisÕ Ñ understood in the decompositional sense Ñ could not yield
these qualities, precisely because they were not seen as constituents of the ele-
mentary experiences (⁄68). CarnapÕs answer was that they are ÔconstructedÕ by
what he called Ôquasi-analysisÕ, a method that mimics analysis in yielding Ôquasi-
constituentsÕ, but which proceeds ÔsyntheticallyÕ rather than ÔanalyticallyÕ (⁄⁄ 69,
74).
In essence, CarnapÕs method of quasi-analysis is just that method of contextual
definition that Frege had introduced in the Grundlagen.11 This was the example
that Frege had given to motivate his logicist ÔconstructionsÕ:
9 CarnapÕs informal account of quasi-analysis is presented in Division C (ÔDie BasisÕ) of Part
III of the Aufbau, ⁄⁄ 61-83, esp. ⁄⁄ 68-74, and his formal account in Division A of Part IV, ⁄⁄ 106-
22. Unless otherwise indicated, references given in what follows are to the relevant sections of the
Aufbau.
10 Carnap also outlines a physicalistic version, the offering of alternative ÔreductionsÕ suggesting
that Carnap is less concerned with uncovering the ultimate metaphysical components of our expe-
riences than with the structural features that they have in common.
11 Carnap himself talks of the Frege-Russellian Ôprinciple of abstractionÕ in ⁄69, and mentions
its source in FregeÕs Grundlagen in ⁄73. Whether Frege himself, however, would have regarded it
as a principle of ÔabstractionÕ is questionable, as I explain in the next section. For FregeÕs own
discussion, see Grundlagen, ⁄⁄ 62-9.
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(Da) Line a is parallel to line b.
(Db) The direction of line a is identical with the direction of line b.
A line, we might suggest, is also an ÔindivisibleÕ unit (at least in so far as it is
intuited, i.e. where it is not seen as ÔcomposedÕ of an infinity of points, or smaller
lines).12 Yet it too has properties that can be ascribed to it on the basis of the
relations it has to other geometrical figures. In particular, we can talk of its
ÔdirectionÕ, which, whilst not literally a ÔconstituentÕ of it arrived at by (decom-
positional) ÔanalysisÕ, can nevertheless be introduced contextually, by means of
the relation of parallelism. Frege had used this example to explain the correspond-
ing definition of ÔnumberÕ, encapsulated in what is now called ÔHumeÕs PrincipleÕ:
(Na) The concept F is equinumerous to the concept G.
(Nb) The number of FÕs is identical with the number of GÕs.
Here too we have an equivalence relation holding between things of one kind
(concepts) being used to define Ñ or ÔconstructÕ, as Carnap would put it Ñ things
of another kind (numbers). Numbers too are not constituents of the concepts to
which they are ascribed, but are ÔconstructedÕ from the appropriate equivalence
relation. Although in the end, Frege went on to give explicit definitions of the
individual numbers, HumeÕs Principle still stood at the base of his system, and
Axiom V of the Grundgesetze, introducing (or underpinning the introduction of)
the value-ranges that were used to define the numbers, was to have the same
form.13
How, then, does Carnap apply the method of contextual definition? Although
he distinguishes between ÔanalysisÕ and Ôquasi-analysisÕ, what he actually gives
to explain the operation of Ôquasi-analysisÕ is an example of ÔanalysisÕ, involving
colours, which at least normally are thought of as properties rather than Ôquasi-
propertiesÕ of objects (⁄70).14 The simplest case can be seen as based on the
following (seemingly trivial) contextual definition, the term Ôis equicoloured toÕ
12 Strictly speaking, it is the whole judgement that two lines are parallel that is seen as Ôindivis-
ibleÕ, if the analogy with CarnapÕs ÔElementarerlebnisÕ, involving the recognition of a similarity
relation, is pursued. This raises important issues, not least concerning how we Ôanalyse outÕ the
objects that are supposed to have the qualities. But I ignore these complications here. Cf. n. 18 below.
13 I discuss the role of HumeÕs Principle and Axiom V, in relation to FregeÕs developing
conception of analysis, in Frege: Making Sense (1996), esp. ch. 5.
14 Given CarnapÕs avowed ontological neutrality, it might seem surprising that Carnap presup-
poses that colours are properties rather than Ôquasi-propertiesÕ. I return to this below.
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abbreviating Ôhas the same colour asÕ (to bring out its connection with the exam-
ples just given):15
(Fa) Object X is equicoloured to object Y.
(Fb) The colour of X is identical with the colour of Y.
Accepting such a definition as unproblematic,16 and given that being Ôequico-
louredÕ is an equivalence relation, we can immediately proceed to form the equiv-
alence classes, within the relevant domain, from which to (structurally) define the
constituent colours.
Now the details of this procedure, and the complications and difficulties that
it gives rise to, need not concern us here.17 What is important is the central
distinction between ÔanalysisÕ, understood as uncovering ÔconstituentsÕ, and Ôqua-
si-analysisÕ, understood as constructing Ôquasi-constituentsÕ. But this formulation
suggests that the distinction is an ontological one, which seems in conflict with
CarnapÕs professed ontological neutrality. Carnap remarks that ÔanalysisÕ and
Ôquasi-analysisÕ are formally analogous (⁄69) Ñ to the extent that both make use
of the method of abstraction (contextual definition). But if we wanted to capture
the distinction more formally, we might suggest that we distinguish between the
following two results, (Fb) and (Fb bbb ), of the method as applied to our initial
proposition (Fa):
(Fa) Object X is equicoloured to object Y.
(Fb) The colour of X is identical with the colour of Y.
(Fb bbb ) The colour (constituent) of X is equal to the colour (constituent) of Y.
For if analysis yields constituents rather than Ôquasi-constituentsÕ, and the wholes
of which the constituents are parts are themselves distinct (i.e. the objects X and
Y in this case),18 then the two colour constituents of X and Y cannot, strictly
speaking, be identical but only equal, in the relevant respect. So whilst Ôquasi-
analysisÕ can be seen as yielding (Fb), ÔanalysisÕ should be thought of as yielding
(Fb bbb ).
15 The term ÔequicolouredÕ used here is my own.
16 I take up the question of CarnapÕs precise understanding of (Fb) shortly.
17 For discussion, see Goodman, 1977: ch. 5; Runggaldier, 1984: Part II; Richardson, 1998: ch.
2; and Beaney (forthcoming: ch. 7).
18 This rules out Siamese twin cases, where one or more constituent parts are shared by two
larger wholes. Again, this reveals how ontological assumptions may underlie conceptions of anal-
ysis. Cf. n. 12 above.
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However, if this account of ÔanalysisÕ is right, then an infinite regress threatens.
For if two ÔconstituentsÕ are uncovered, then there will be some similarity relation
holding between them, in which case the method of abstraction (contextual defi-
nition) can be applied again to uncover further constituents. So either we need
some different account of ÔconstituentÕ, which Carnap does not supply, or we no
longer have a clear distinction between analysis and quasi-analysis. All we really
have is quasi-analysis; and this in any case might seem to be all we have in ÔpureÕ
uses of the method of abstraction, which, after all, is seen more as a ÔconstructiveÕ
process.
Of course, if there is no viable distinction between analysis and quasi-analysis,
where both are seen as involving the method of abstraction, then this might seem
to support the neo-Kantian rather than Russellian interpretation Ñ or better,
Ôrational reconstructionÕ Ñ of CarnapÕs Aufbau project. But the truth seems to be
that Carnap, at the time of the Aufbau, was in a transitional stage. His position
was inherently unstable: he was in the process of freeing himself from the Rus-
sellian programme that had to some extent inspired him, whilst allowing his more
neo-Kantian instincts, which one might suggest were more deeply embedded in
his philosophical outlook, to guide his development, a development that was to
lead to the conception of logical analysis characteristic of his later philosophy.
This conception surfaces even in the Aufbau. Here is one characteristic passage,
in which Carnap summarizes his view of quasi-analysis:
the analysis or, more precisely, quasi-analysis of an entity that is essentially an indivisible
unit into several quasi-constituents means placing the entity in several kinship contexts on
the basis of a kinship relation, where the unit remains undivided. (⁄71.)19
Compare this with CarnapÕs characterization of logical analysis in his 1934 paper,
ÔDie Methode der logischen AnalyseÕ:
19 The German text reads: Òdie Analyse, richtiger: Quasianalyse, eines Gebildes, das seinem
Wesen nach eine unzerlegbare Einheit ist, in mehrere Quasibestandteile bedeutet die Einordnung
des Gebildes in mehrere Verwandtschaftszusammenhnge auf Grund einer Verwandtschafts-
beziehung, wobei die Einheit unzerteilt bleibt.Ó I have slightly altered the standard English transla-
tion (by Rolf A. George), which renders Ôeines Gebildes, das seinem Wesen nach eine unzerlegbare
Einheit istÕ simply as Ôof an essentially unanalyzable entityÕ, which does not do full justice in this
context to the meaning of ÔunzerlegbarÕ and its echo in the use of ÔunzerteiltÕ that follows. It is worth
noting here that in an early draft of what became the Aufbau, Carnap did indeed talk of ÔZerlegungÕ
and ÔQuasizerlegungÕ rather than ÔAnalyseÕ and ÔQuasianalyseÕ, but perhaps his later choice of terms
indicates a growing awareness that ÔanalysisÕ is to be understood less in the decompositional and
more in the interpretive sense.
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The logical analysis of a particular expression consists in the setting-up of a linguistic system
and the placing of that expression in this system. (1936: p. 143.)20
After the publication of the Aufbau, Carnap never talks of Ôquasi-analysisÕ again,
except in referring to the ideas of the Aufbau itself, and we can see why. For in
the contrast it suggests with ÔanalysisÕ, there were realist undertones of an onto-
logical kind that Carnap was later keen to purge. Given that the underlying method
Ñ the method of abstraction Ñ was the same in both cases, then there was no
need to distinguish between ÔanalysisÕ and Ôquasi-analysisÕ. What we are thus left
with is paraphrastic analysis without the metaphysics of reduction. But the para-
phrasis involved here was aimed at motivating the construction of a ÔKonstitu-
tionssystemÕ, and it is this latter aspect that talk of ÔpostulationalÕ analysis cap-
tures. Postulational analysis might thus be characterized as paraphrastic analysis
undertaken in the service of the development of a new conceptual system.
In the Aufbau, the phrase that Carnap used to characterize his project of Ôpos-
tulationalÕ analysis was Ôrational reconstructionÕ. In his later work, the term Ôex-
plicationÕ was used. This latter term did not appear in CarnapÕs published work
until 1945, but as his preface to the second edition of the Aufbau, which appeared
in 1961, makes clear, ÔexplicationÕ was simply the new term for Ôrational recon-
structionÕ. The idea of explication received its fullest discussion in the first chapter
of Logical Foundations of Probability, published in 1950, but it was also clarified
in Meaning and Necessity, which appeared in 1947, where Carnap wrote:
The task of making more exact a vague or not quite exact concept used in everyday life or
in an earlier stage of scientific or logical development, or rather of replacing it by a newly
constructed, more exact concept, belongs among the most important tasks of logical analysis
and logical construction. We call this the task of explicating, or of giving an explication for,
the earlier concept É (1947: pp. 8-9.)
In illustrating this conception, Carnap specifically takes the example of FregeÕs
and RussellÕs logicist ÔexplicationÕ of number terms such as ÔtwoÕ Ñ Òthe term
ÔtwoÕ in the not quite exact meaning in which it is used in everyday life and in
applied mathematicsÓ, and their different explications of phrases of the form Ôthe
so-and-soÕ (1947: ⁄2). But he does not comment on what was the major difference
between Frege and Russell here Ñ that Russell, unlike Frege, utilized Ôexplica-
tionÕ as part of an ontologically eliminativist project. In this respect, Carnap
20 ÒDie logische Analyse eines bestimmten Ausdrucks besteht in der Aufstellung eines Sprach-
systems und in der Einordnung des Ausdrucks in dieses System.Ó The paper was written for a
conference in Prague in September 1934, but was not published until 1936.
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remained much closer to Frege than to Russell Ñ or perhaps more accurately,
moved back closer to Frege after going through a quasi-Russellian phase. CarnapÕs
own conception of logical analysis finally fulfilled its own telos Ñ to liberate
paraphrastic analysis from reductive analysis.
⁄4 Contextual Definition: Frege Revisited
One way of clarifying the central thread in the story of analytic philosophy as it
runs from Frege through Russell to Carnap is by focusing on the use of contextual
definition. Introduced by Frege in those central sections of the Grundlagen that
Michael Dummett has suggested inaugurated the Ôlinguistic turnÕ in philosophy,21
but which I would prefer to characterize as heralding the ÔparaphrasticÕ turn, what
is notable about this first use is the way in which contextual definition Ñ or
paraphrasis generally Ñ is not used to do eliminativist work, in the sense of
supplying a method for a project of ontological pruning. The eliminativist possi-
bilities of contextual definition were first suggested by RussellÕs theory of de-
scriptions, in which paraphrasis was coupled with decomposition in an attempt to
uncover the ultimate constituents of reality. But the possibility of using contextual
definition Ñ or paraphrasis generally Ñ simply to reveal logical structure (in a
more neo-Kantian rather than Russellian way) was demonstrated by CarnapÕs
conception of Ôquasi-analysisÕ. But as his use of the phrase Ôquasi-analysisÕ shows,
he had still not yet broken free of the grip of the reductive conception of analysis
that was so central to RussellÕs conception of analysis.
FregeÕs analysis of existential and number statements does, I think, mark a
genuine turning-point in philosophy and heralds the development of analytic
philosophy. Take the case of negative existentials, which proved particularly
problematic right up to the time of Meinong and the early Russell. On FregeÕs
account, existential statements (like number statements generally) are construed
as claims about concepts, i.e. as involving the attribution of second-level proper-
ties to first-level properties.22 A statement such as (0a), in other words, is to be
analysed as (0b), which can be readily formalized in his new logic as (0c):
21 Dummett, 1991, p. 111: ÒOf these inspired sections, ⁄62 is arguably the most pregnant
philosophical paragraph ever written É it is the very first example of what has become known as
the Ôlinguistic turnÕ in philosophy. FregeÕs Grundlagen may justly be called the first work of
analytical philosophy.Ó
22 Cf. Grundlagen, ⁄⁄ 46ff.
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(0a)  FÕs do not exist. [There are no FÕs.]
(0b) The concept F is not instantiated.
(0c) Ø ØØØ ($ x) Fx. [(" x) Ø  Fx.]
On a Fregean account, the analysis of (0a) does not proceed by decomposition,
and run into the difficulty of explaining what the ÔFÕsÕ are which have the mys-
terious property of non-existence, but by interpretation or rephrasal, offering (0b)
and its logical formalization (0c) instead. The problems that traditionally arose
then just drop away (although an account of concepts and quantifiers, of course,
is still required).
Such an analysis clearly opens up the possibility of an eliminativist project,
pruning the extravagant ontology that Meinong and Russell had felt obliged to
posit. But what is intriguing about FregeÕs work is that he does not, at least
explicitly, pursue this project. Consider his notorious problems with the paradox
of the concept horse. On any natural view, the following proposition seems to be
obviously true:
(Ha) The concept horse is a concept.
Yet analysing (Ha) decompositionally, the logically significant parts, on FregeÕs
view, are the proper name Ôthe concept horseÕ and the concept expression Ô( ) is
a conceptÕ. If the proposition as a whole has a reference (Bedeutung), then each
of these parts must also have a reference (Bedeutung), according to Frege. Since
proper names refer to objects and concept expressions refer to concepts, and there
is an absolute distinction between (unsaturated) concepts and (saturated) objects,
ÔThe concept horseÕ must refer to an object, so that (Ha), taken literally, is false,
not true. Clearly, something has gone wrong, and FregeÕs only response, biting
the bullet, is to admit that ÔThe concept horseÕ does indeed stand for an object,
but one that goes proxy for the concept, a response that seems as ontologically
inflationary and metaphysically mysterious as the views of Meinong and the early
Russell.23
In the light of what was said above, however, there is clearly a better response
available. (Ha) needs to be analysed not decompositionally, but paraphrastically.
And this is indeed just the response that Dummett later made on FregeÕs behalf.24
On the assumption that the concept horse is sharp (i.e. that it divides all objects
23 Cf. Frege, ÔOn Concept and ObjectÕ, in The Frege Reader, pp. 184-5.
24 Dummett, 1981: pp. 216-17. Cf. Beaney, 1996: ⁄7.3.
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into those that fall under it and those that do not), (Ha) is to be interpreted as (Hb),
which like (0b) above, can be given a straightforward formalization in the predi-
cate calculus, as (Hc):
(Hb) Everything is either a horse or not a horse.
(Hc) (" x) (Hx Ú Ø Hx).
Given that the general strategy of analysing by paraphrasing had been just what
Frege had done in the Grundlagen, it may seem surprising that he failed to pursue
that further in the case of the paradox of the concept horse, especially since the
paradox seems to cry out for such treatment. But as the history of RussellÕs
development between The Principles of Mathematics and ÔOn DenotingÕ shows,
the possibility of using paraphrastic analysis to resolve ontological problems was
a hard-won insight, and Frege, despite introducing and powerfully employing this
form of analysis within his logicist project, did not appreciate its full potential.
Even whilst offering paraphrastic analysis, FregeÕs ontological outlook was still
unduly influenced by a decompositional conception of analysis.
FregeÕs failure to appreciate the distinction between paraphrastic and decom-
positional analysis was also responsible for the tension in his thought concerning
the status of his Grundlagen contextual definitions and Axiom V of the
Grundgesetze, a tension that has given rise to a great deal of controversy in the
interpretation of Frege and in the recent debate over attempts to revitalize FregeÕs
logicism. In the Grundlagen, Frege clearly regards both (Da) and (Db), and (Na)
and (Nb), as given above, as having the same ÔcontentÕ (ÔInhaltÕ), but in his later
work he vacillates somewhat between saying that they merely have the same
reference (Bedeutung) and saying that they have both the same reference and the
same sense (Sinn).25 But in both the Grundlagen and the Grundgesetze, it is clear
how his thinking goes. Taking the key case of (Na) and (Nb), if (Na) is true, and
(Na) and (Nb) are equivalent (all that is required here is that they are logically
equivalent), then (Nb) is true, i.e. has a reference, on FregeÕs view (since the
reference of a proposition just is its truth-value). But if this is so, then, by the
principle mentioned above that the reference of a whole is dependent on the
reference of its parts, then all the logically significant parts of (Nb) must also have
a reference. So the number terms, in particular, must refer Ñ and refer, as proper
names, to independent objects. Frege is clearly not using the method of contextual
25 For detailed discussion and references, see Beaney, 1996: ⁄⁄ 5.3-5.5, 8.1.
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definition here as a method of abstraction Ñ in the way that Carnap was later to
use it Ñ in the sense of moving up an ontological level. (Na) and (Nb) are seen
as on the same ontological level, an assumption, of course, that was responsible
for the contradiction in FregeÕs system that Russell discovered in 1902. In seeking
to explain or derive (Nb) from (Na), through paraphrastic analysis, and at the same
time understanding (Nb) decompositionally, Frege is trying to both have his cake
and eat it. Insofar as (Nb) is genuinely equivalent to (Na), then (Nb) cannot involve
any other ontological commitments than are already involved in (Na), so (Nb)
cannot be regarded as making reference to numbers construed as ÔindependentÕ
objects. Rabbits can only be pulled out of hats if they are already there. So if the
account of (Nb) runs through (Na), it cannot also be analysed Ñ ontologically Ñ
decompositionally.26
Appreciation of the distinction between paraphrastic and decompositional
analysis thus allows us not only to identify what is new and valuable in FregeÕs
philosophy, regarding his analysis of existential and number statements, but also
to diagnose what is problematic in his philosophy Ñ in particular, concerning the
paradox of the concept horse and the tension in his thought about the status of his
key definitions and Axiom V, the axiom that Frege himself held responsible for
the contradiction in his system. Whilst introducing paraphrastic analysis, Frege
did not fully think through its implications, and remained wedded to a decompo-
sitional conception of analysis, which he naively applied even where it was neither
needed nor legitimate.
It is important, then, to appreciate the distinction between paraphrastic and
decompositional analysis; and this holds not just for an understanding of FregeÕs
philosophy, but for analytic philosophy generally. I will conclude here by simply
noting how the distinction we have drawn may also be used in answering the
question as to the sense in which we can still talk of Ôanalytic philosophyÕ more
than a century after its origins. To some philosophers, we have long since entered
a Ôpost-analyticÕ era; yet the term Ôanalytic philosophyÕ seems to be more widely
used than ever to designate what is not only seen as the mainstream tradition in
the English-speaking world but also, increasingly, a major movement in continen-
tal Europe. Whilst ÔreductiveÕ analysis still flourishes, it is the extensive use of
26 This is not to say that decompositional analysis cannot be employed for linguistic purposes,
for example, in explaining how we understand the linguistic meaning of (Nb). The point is that we
must respect the differences between linguistic meaning, sense and reference, and not automatically
assume that the same form of analysis will be appropriate for each in a given case.
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ÔparaphrasticÕ analysis, which Frege introduced and Russell and Carnap consoli-
dated (albeit in their different ways), that underpins more, I think, the legitimacy
of the term Ôanalytic philosophyÕ, and those who talk of Ôpost-analyticÕ philosophy
merely mean that it is ÔreductiveÕ analysis that has (or should have) been left
behind. Of course, over the last century, analytic philosophy has become a very
broad church indeed, and to say that it is held together by concern with analysis,
in whatever way, is to say virtually nothing. But as I hope I have shown, by looking
briefly at one chapter in the history of analytic philosophy, there is an intricate
and continually shifting web of conceptions of analysis involved here, which
sometimes combine effectively and sometimes pull apart, and it is this complex
and contested web that characterizes, and will continue to characterize, analytic
philosophy.27
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